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In and out of neoliberalism: Reconsidering the sociology of Raymond 
Aron 
Abstract 
This article reconsiders the work of Raymond Aron in order to explore the 
fracture lines that existed (and in many ways continue to exist) between 
conservative forms of political liberalism, as advocated by Aron, and 
neoliberal ideas of economic or market freedom associated with Hayek and 
his followers. These tensions between Aron and Hayek are analysed by 
assessing Aron’s involvement in the Mont Pèlerin Society and the Congress 
for Cultural Freedom through the 1950s, and then considering the 
arguments of his 1962 review of Hayek’s Constitution of Liberty and his 1963 
Jefferson Lectures. While Aron has been largely neglected in the existing 
literature on neoliberalism, it will be argued that he was the key sociological 
figure to engage critically with neoliberalism in its formative years and, 
beyond this, that the value of his work today lies in its defence of the social 
basis of democracy and freedom against the raw economism of neoliberal 
thought. 
Keywords 
Aron, freedom, Hayek, industrial society, liberalism, Marxism, neoliberalism 
There is currently a tendency within sociological theory to treat neoliberalism as 
an all-encompassing hegemonic project: one that asserts the overarching powers 
of the market over all aspects of social and cultural life, a development which is 
said not only to be without organised opposition from the political Left (which 
is often said to be drawn increasingly onto neoliberal ground; see, for example, 
Dardot and Laval, 2014: 1–18) but to be largely free from internal disputes and 
divisions. This article takes issue with the latter part of such an argument by 
examining the role that Raymond Aron played in contesting the neoliberal 
project from its inside in its formative years. Rather than treating neoliberalism 
as a unified ‘thought collective’, one associated, in the first instance, with the 
membership of the Mont Pèlerin Society (as argued by Plehwe, 2009: 4), it will 
be argued that the picture is far more complex than this, not least because 
sociologists such as Aron who were members of this Society openly sought to 
distance themselves from the ideas of key neoliberal figures such as Friedrich 
Hayek. This article will centre on the work of Aron in order to explore the 
fracture lines that existed (and perhaps continue to exist) between conservative 
forms of political liberalism, as advocated by Aron, and neoliberal ideas of 
economic or market freedom associated with Hayek and his followers. These 
tensions between Aron and Hayek will be examined by looking in detail at 
Aron’s involvement in the Mont Pèlerin Society and the Congress for Cultural 
Freedom through the 1950s, and then considering the arguments of his 1962 
review of Hayek’s Constitution of Liberty and his 1963 Jefferson Lectures. 
While Aron has been largely neglected in the existing literature on neoliberalism, 
it will be argued that he was the key sociological figure to engage critically with 
neoliberalism in its formative years and, beyond this, that the value of his work 
today lies in its defence of historical and comparative sociological analysis 
against the underlying economism of Hayekian thought. 
Sociology and neoliberalism: From Paris to Mont Pèlerin 
This article will start with two landmark events in the history of neoliberalism at 
which there was a strong but little-known sociological presence. The first is the 
Walter Lippmann Colloquium. This event was held in Paris from 26 to 30 August 
1938 to celebrate the publication of the French translation of The Good Society 
(in French La Cité Libre), a work that had originally been published by 
Lippmann (1938), a prominent American journalist, the year before (for a 
detailed pre-history of the Colloquium, see Burgin, 2012: 67–72; for its 
proceedings and a detailed commentary, see Audier, 2012a). This Colloquium 
was organised by Louis Rougier (a philosopher of science who was, in the words 
of Foucault (2008), ‘one of the rare and very good post-war French 
epistemologists’; p. 161) and involved 26 main participants that included, among 
others, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek (leading Austrian economists 
who were well versed in classical sociology; see Gane, 2014), Wilhelm Röpke 
and Alexander Rüstow (key figures in the post-War development of German 
ordoliberalism; see Foucault, 2008: 75–158), Jacques Rueff (a leading French 
economist who later became an advisor to de Gaulle) and three prominent 
sociologists: Raymond Aron, Alfred Schutz and Michael Polanyi. The event ran 
across 4 days and was organised around the following main themes: whether the 
decline of liberalism was due to ‘endogenous causes’; liberalism and the 
economy of war; liberalism and economic nationalism; liberalism and the ‘social 
question’; psychological and sociological causes for the decline of liberalism; 
and whether liberalism itself needed to be reinvented (for running order of these 
sessions, see Audier, 2012a: 411–495). 
Lippmann, in his opening ‘allocution’ at this event, advanced the following 
position: that laissez-faire or ‘old’ liberalism had been unable to serve as a guide 
to human conduct and that rather than repeat doctrines from the nineteenth century 
it was now necessary to take part in an ‘extensive revision’ of such ideas and in so 
doing play a role ‘in a decisive struggle for the defence of civilization’ (Lippmann 
in Audier, 2012a: 427, translation mine). Unsurprisingly, this view proved to be 
divisive, and through the course of the Colloquium, two main groups emerged: 
first, those who argued that there was nothing ‘to criticise or change in traditional 
liberalism as it was and as it is’ (this was mainly the position of von Mises), and 
second, those that saw the reasons for the decline of liberalism as lying in 
liberalism itself and who argued as a consequence that a ‘fundamental renewal’ of 
the liberal project was needed (Rüstow in Audier, 2012a: 478–479; translation 
mine). The ordoliberals (Röpke and Rüstow) positioned themselves in the latter 
camp, and argued that it was necessary to move beyond a stark choice between a 
society that is accepting of ‘free price formation’ and another ‘organised on a basis 
other than competition’ (Rüstow in Audier, 2012a: 488). Lippmann, for his part, 
largely sided with them and argued in the penultimate session of the Colloquium 
that the next step was to develop a new liberalism that was not simply economic 
in basis, but which took account of the role of the state in determining the legal 
framework that made free economic activity possible. There was little, if any, 
agreement over the details of this agenda, and even the name that should be given 
to this new liberalism proved contentious (various terms such as ‘positive’ 
liberalism were discussed and in turn dismissed), but, nonetheless, the Colloquium 
was important as it placed a number of core liberal thinkers from different national 
settings into contact with one another and put the idea of a new or neoliberal project 
firmly on the agenda. 
The practical outcomes of the Colloquium, however, were limited. The main 
development was the founding of a centre for the study of the renewal of 
liberalism (formally titled ‘Comité international d’étude pour le renouveau du 
libéralisme’ or CIRL), a project that was led by Louis Rougier and the economist 
Louis Marlio and which involved other key figures from the Colloquium such as 
Hayek and Röpke (for an overview of the formation and activities of this 
organisation, see Audier, 2012b: 157–164). The Centre was inaugurated in 
March 1939, but its activities soon halted following the outbreak of war in 
September that year – an event that split its French members politically (see 
Denord, 2009: 51) and scattered many of the original participants of the 
Colloquium geographically (von Mises, for example, moved to New York). The 
momentum of the new liberal movement was temporarily lost, and for this reason 
Jamie Peck (2008: 30) argues that neoliberalism, as a coherent body of ideas and 
practices on the ground, had ‘a false start at the Colloque Walter Lippmann’ and 
only received a ‘kick start’ following a second event: the founding of the Mont 
Pèlerin Society by Hayek in 1947.  
The history of the Mont Pèlerin Society – the transnational think-tank that 
brought different strands of Austrian, German, British, French and American 
neoliberal thought into contact with one another – has now been well 
documented (see Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009). But one aspect has, to date, been 
neglected: the inclusion of key sociological figures in the early years of its 
membership. Indeed, this is one of the main lines of continuity between the 
Lippmann Colloquium and the Mont Pèlerin Society as Aron, Schutz and 
Michael Polanyi were all present at the former and were also involved in the 
early activities of the latter. This points to an input of sociological ideas into the 
early life of neoliberalism, even if, as will be argued below, these ideas ultimately 
proved to be incompatible with the neoliberal doctrines advanced by key figures 
such as Friedrich Hayek. This article will address these tensions by focussing on 
the work of Raymond Aron – arguably the most prominent sociologist to be 
involved in the early formulation of the neoliberal project and to break publicly 
with this project once it became defined by an overriding commitment to 
economic, or to be more precise, market-centred freedoms. 
Beauvallon and beyond 
An obvious place to start in considering Aron’s position within the neoliberal 
movement is his participation in the Colloquium and the Mont Pèlerin Society. 
This, however, is more difficult than might be thought, for while Aron, along 
with Polanyi and Schutz, attended the Walter Lippmann Colloquium (indeed, 
Foucault (2008) notes that Aron was the ‘general secretary’ of this event; p. 132), 
neither Aron nor Schutz made any recorded contribution, and Polanyi spoke only 
once; on the fourth day of the Colloquium in a session on the psychological, 
sociological, political and ideological causes for the decline of liberalism (see 
Audier, 2012a: 472–475). That Aron did not speak at the Colloquium is perhaps 
not surprising as he was still at an early stage of his career and had at that time 
only published an early book on German sociology and two theses on philosophy 
and history. But even if Aron was a junior member of the Colloquium, at least 
when compared to figures such as Mises and Hayek, he was a prodigious talent 
and would have been recognised as such by Rougier. Aron had come first in the 
agègation at the École Normale Supérieure in 1928 (the same year in which Jean-
Paul Sartre failed this exam; see Aron, 1990: 25), where his faculty advisor was 
Célestin Bouglé (who, with Emile Durkheim, had co-founded L’Année 
Sociologique in 1896). He spent his early teaching years in Cologne and then 
Berlin (see Aron 1997: 24), and as a result had detailed knowledge of German 
social theory (see Aron, 1957a: 131). More important within the context of the 
Colloquium, however, were Aron’s political commitments. He claims to have 
been a socialist before the War, or more precisely until he studied political 
economy (Aron, 1997: 37), but even in the early years of his career he was hostile 
to many of the ideas of Marx (see Aron, 1990: 41) and sought to rid himself of 
‘the superstition that Sartre defended to his dying day: “the right are all bastards” 
...’ (Aron, 1990: 55). If Aron was a socialist, it involved a commitment to a 
socialism of a weak kind. While he maintained an interest in Keynesian 
economics throughout his career (see, for example, 1957a: x), which he thought 
closer to reality than classical political economy (see 1961a: 18), relations 
between Aron and most figures on the political Left were fractious, in particular 
with Sartre, whom Aron (1990) later labelled a ‘nasty kid’ who never ‘diagnosed 
Soviet totalitarianism, the cancer of the century, and ... never condemned it as 
such’ (p. 330). Aron, in turn, was castigated by the Left for refusing to support 
the student protests of May 1968, which he dismissed as little more as a 
‘psychodrama’. Aron’s (1969) critique of these events, alongside his argument 
that the trade union movement is the ‘fundamental conservative force’ in 
advanced industrial societies (p. 27), led Sartre to attack Aron publicly in an 
article in Le Nouvel Observateur, through the course of which he accused Aron 
of repeating ‘to his students ideas from his thesis, written before 1939’, adding 
that ‘while those listening to him have no opportunity to exercise any critical 
control over him, he is exercising a real power, but one that is certainly not based 
on scholarship worthy of that name’ (Sartre cited in Aron, 1990: 327). For these 
reasons, among others, Aron has often been dismissed as a sociological apologist 
for the Right (see Audier, 2012a: 241), although as Peter Baehr (2013) has 
warned, ‘we should avoid caricature’ (pp. 107–108) as Aron never aligned 
himself with the new Right and refused to be a neoliberal in the Hayekian mould. 
In the 1930s, Aron was part of a powerful group of liberal thinkers in France 
that included fellow participants of the Walter Lippmann Colloquium such as 
Louis Baudin, an economist at the Sorbonne who later became a member of the 
Mont Pèlerin Society, and Etienne Mantoux, who wrote a stinging critique of 
Keynes’ position on the Treaty of Versailles that was lauded by figures such as 
William Rappard (a founder member of the Society) and Jacob Viner (a key 
figure in the emergence of Chicago School economics). While Louis Rougier 
was the organiser of the Walter Lippmann Colloquium, it would be a mistake, as 
Serge Audier (2012b: 146) has observed, to assume that he assembled a group 
of French thinkers that were united by an agreed set of sociological or ideological 
commitments, for this was not the case. Rather, this group was, in practice, far 
more ‘nébuleuse’. Nonetheless, Audier groups Aron together with two other 
members of the Colloquium – Robert Marjolin (an economist who became an 
advisor to de Gaulle through the Second World War) and Roger Auboin (an 
economist who specialised in questions of international cooperation in monetary 
policy) – whose liberal ideas were very much shaped by the threat and experience 
of war. Marjolin, in particular, proved to be an important contact. In his Memoirs, 
Aron (1990) recalls, 
During my first stay in London [1940], I again met Robert Marjolin ... 
Through him, I met the liberal economists of the Reform Club, Lionel Robbins 
(now Lord Robbins), Friedrich von Hayek, and others, with whom I had 
dinner almost every Thursday during the war. 
 
(p. 116) 
At a later point in this same text, Aron (1990) adds, ‘During these years I lived 
in French circles, but I also entered into English society. The Reform Club and 
the liberal group – Lionel Robbins, Friedrich Hayek – welcomed me with a 
generosity that I remember with gratitude’ (p. 133). Oddly, given that Aron was 
in close contact with Hayek through the War, there is no other mention of him 
in his Memoirs, and he gives no indication of what, exactly, was discussed at 
these dinners and in meetings at the Reform Club. This, however, is not the only 
biographical detail that is missing from Aron’s Memoirs: there is no mention of 
the Walter Lippmann Colloquium (although this seems to be a common pattern 
among its attendees; see Audier, 2012b: 156) or of figures such as Rougier, 
Mises, Röpke, Baudin or Mantoux whom he would have met in person in Paris 
and whose work, presumably, he would have known well. There is also no 
mention of the Mont Pèlerin Society, which he later joined – presumably at the 
invitation of Hayek. It appears that in later life Aron purposively sought to 
expunge these connections from his biography. The question this begs is, ‘why?’ 
The records of the Mont Pèlerin Society list Aron as a new member in 1949, 
and 2 years later he delivered his only formal presentation to the Society at its 
annual meeting in Beauvallon, France. This presentation was part of a session on 
‘The Source of Pro-Soviet Bias Outside Russia’, which also included speeches 
by Carlo Antoni, an Italian philosopher based at the University of Rome, and 
Rebecca West, a British novelist and journalist famed, among other things, for 
covering the Nuremburg Trials for the New Yorker. Aron opened his speech by 
drawing a distinction between the ‘reds’ and the ‘pinks’ – between militants who 
were part of the Leftist establishment in France and those who held more 
moderate socialist beliefs and, while broadly sympathetic to the Marxist cause, 
denounced certain aspects of the Soviet regime. The main target of Aron’s 
critique was the ‘reds’ and, in particular, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, who, he 
claims, knew of the horrors of Stalinism and yet refused to take a stand against 
communism. He argues that the reason for this is that they believed in the 
unconditional defence of just causes, regardless of the consequences, and could 
not confront the reality of state violence in the Soviet Union because they 
believed devoutly in three related myths: the revolt and triumph of the people, 
anti-capitalism, and confidence in progress and history.  
Aron analyses each of these beliefs in turn before arguing, in response, that 
there is a tendency for the Left to blame everything on capitalism, and to 
denounce inequality as something that is intrinsically part of capitalism while 
placing messianic hope in the belief that it will disappear under conditions of 
communism. Aron here derides the intellectual and political practice of the 
Marxist Left by asking who is in the position to reveal the ‘rational’ or ‘scientific’ 
principles of history and of the communist alternative. His answer is that it is a 
privileged elite that charge themselves with the responsibility for teaching the 
masses what the society of the future will look like. He argues that such an 
arrangement, performed in the name of ‘revolutionary rationalism’, can lead, at 
best, to enlightened despotism and, at worst, to the tyranny of a greedy minority 
that have a range of modern techniques of power at their disposal. For these 
reasons, Aron concludes his speech at Beauvallon by arguing that three lessons 
must be learned from the tragedy of Stalinism. First, a sociological lesson: that a 
heavily regulated economy tied to a system of collective property is not 
necessarily emancipatory in basis but instead can give rise to new means of 
oppression. Second, a political lesson: that a party that claims absolute power 
under the pretext of transforming the social order will end up creating a system 
that will rule through the despotism of the minority. And finally, a philosophical 
lesson: that it is an illusion that all we need is a heroic act from a few people in 
order to topple the normal ways of human society. Aron (1961b) here advances 
the following dictum: ‘Revolutions are sometimes inevitable but are almost 
always a tragedy [un malheur]’ (p. 10, translation mine). 
Many of these ideas are developed at greater length by Aron in his Opium of 
the Intellectuals, published 4 years later in 1955. This work questions the 
political ‘myths’ – ‘the left’, ‘the revolution’, ‘the proletariat’, ‘progress’, 
‘necessity’ – that are central to Marxist thought and asks whether ‘planned’ 
economies (see Aron, 1957b: 22) or ‘socialist societies’ (Aron, 1957b: 237) bring 
an end to inequality or instead simply reproduce the structural inequalities of 
capitalism, albeit in a different form. Aron (1957b) takes the latter view and 
argues that in such societies, ‘just as under capitalism, the “boss class” lays down 
the law. Soviet managers retain for themselves the equivalent of capitalist profits. 
Incentives, wages and production bonuses resemble the practices of Western 
capitalism of yesterday’ (p. 237). Aron returns to this question of the inequalities 
of Soviet society repeatedly in his writings of the late-1950s and 1960s. In 
Progress and Disillusion, for example, he declares that ‘inequality of income is 
not always greater in a Western society than in societies of the Soviet type’ 
(1968: 186; for a more detailed discussion of Soviet stratification, see 1968: 16–
20). In The Opium of the Intellectuals, however, Aron’s (1957b) main concern 
is why the Left refused to see the inequalities that had been produced by 
communism and instead believed, unbendingly, in the ‘infallibility of the Party’ 
(pp. 106–114). Aron’s explanation is that Marxism had taken on the form of a 
religion that intellectuals on the Left refused to see either through or past. He 
writes, 
The Marxist prophetism ... conforms to the typical pattern of the Judeo-
Christian prophetism. Every prophetism condemns what is and sketches an 
outline of what should or will be; it chooses an individual or a group to cleave 
a path across the no-man’s land which separates an unworthy present from the 
radiant future. The classless society which will bring social progress without 
political revolution is comparable to the dreams of the millennium. The misery 
of the proletariat proves its vocation and the Communist Party becomes the 
Church ... 
 
(Aron, 1957b: 267) 
Aron responds by arguing that it is necessary not only to question the 
millenarian basis of revolutionary politics, but also to think sociologically about 
the kinship that existed between Western capitalism and Soviet-style 
communism. For Aron, this is only possible if these two systems are treated as 
different forms of industrial society that are united in their quest to develop 
‘productive forces’. Aron (1967) distanced himself from the French Left by 
arguing that there was no evidence to support what some Marxists called ‘the 
pauperization of the proletariat’ (p. 21) as in fact the reverse was true: the growth 
of capitalist economies post-1945 ‘benefitted all classes’. And against the 
assumption that communist society was necessarily egalitarian in basis he insists 
that all industrial societies, including those of the ‘Soviet type’, operate through 
a combination of ‘hierarchy and competition’, for competition is inevitable in all 
societies ‘where social position is not conferred by heredity’ (Aron, 1968: 43). 
There were, then, structural similarities between different types of industrial 
society, be these capitalist or communist in political organisation, that neither the 
Left nor the Right were prepared to confront. 
Aron contra Hayek 
While Aron’s fractious relationship to the political Left was in keeping with 
many of his colleagues in the Mont Pèlerin Society, his position in relation to the 
Right, and to the core members of the neoliberal project, is more complex. For 
while Aron was clearly hostile to the politics of the French Left and also an early 
member of Mont Pèlerin Society, it would be a mistake, as Audier (2012b: 146) 
has observed, to characterise Aron as a ‘neoliberal of the right’ and as an ‘alter-
ego’ of Hayek. Ties between Aron and Hayek were not strong, perhaps 
explaining why the latter barely appears in Aron’s Memoirs. Aside from his 
single presentation to the Mont Pèlerin Society, Aron sat mainly in the margins 
of the Society and, with Michael Polanyi, devoted his energies instead to a 
different organisation: the Congress for Cultural Freedom. While the Congress 
and the Mont Pèlerin Society initially had some degree of overlap (see Audier 
2012b: 315–317), in practice they were quite different organisations. The 
founding conference of the Congress in Berlin in 1950 was attended by figures 
such as Bertrand Russell, John Dewey, Karl Jaspers and Benedetto Croce, and 
in later years the Congress attracted a strong contingent from the British Left 
(see Wilford, 2003: 193–224) that included high profile figures such as Hugh 
Gaitskell (leader of the opposition from 1955 to 1963) and Anthony Crosland, 
the author of the influential tract The Future of Socialism. Prominent sociologists 
were also involved, particularly in the American branch of the Congress, which 
counted Daniel Bell, Edward Shils and David Riesman among its ranks. Aron 
sat on the executive committee of the Congress in its early years and published 
articles on ‘Asia: Between Malthus and Marx’, ‘Nations and Ideologies’ and 
‘The Fifth Republic’ in its associated journal, Encounter. When it later emerged, 
however, that the Congress was part-financed by the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), Aron distanced himself from the organisation and stated that he had been 
deceived by Michael Josselson, an Estonian who founded the Congress. He 
reflects in his Memoirs that while at the time he had thought ‘that the Congress 
was funded by American foundations’, there were many signs that should have 
alerted them to the real source of its money. Even so, in later life Aron (1990) 
remained unrepentant about his participation in this organisation, stating that he 
was not paid by the Congress and that it gave him ‘the opportunity to defend and 
illustrate ideas which, at the time, needed defenders’ (p. 174). 
Aron and Michael Polanyi were members of the committee that organised the 
1955 Congress conference, which was held in Milan under the title ‘The Future 
of Freedom’. The line-up of speakers at this event was impressive and included 
leading intellectuals from across the social and political sciences including 
Hannah Arendt, Kenneth Galbraith, and Hayek, who had previously contributed 
to discussions at the Congress event on ‘Science and Freedom’ that had been 
organised by Michael Polanyi in Hamburg in 1953 (see Congress for Cultural 
Freedom, 1955). There is no formal record of what was said at the Milan 
conference, but two sketches of this event were published in back-to-back issues 
of Encounter in late-1955: one by Edward Shils and the other by a close friend 
of C. Wright Mills, Dwight MacDonald. MacDonald’s is the livelier and more 
entertaining of the two accounts. He recalls that several rows of seats at the 
conference were reserved for citizens of Milan. In the event very few attended, 
but among those that did was the Chief of Police, ‘who put everyone at their ease 
by ... lighting up a cigarette under a large VIETATO FUMARE sign’ 
(MacDonald, 1955: 70). His overall assessment of the conference, however, is 
damning. For despite the odd highlight (including a clash between Daniel Bell 
and George Kennan over the human value of American culture), he declares that 
the conference was ‘complete failure as a medium for the exchange of ideas’ 
(MacDonald, 1955: 73), not least because it failed to delimit what was meant by 
the term freedom, over which ‘agreement was general, vague, and tepid’ 
(MacDonald, 1955: 74). 
Shils (2006), in turn, dismissed MacDonald’s account as characteristically 
‘flippant and light-headed’ (p. 96) and offered a more sober overview of 
proceedings at this event. He draws particular attention to one of the opening 
sessions in which Aron declared that 
The once unequivocal distinction between ‘right’ and ‘left’ had been damaged 
by the knowledge that combinations once alleged by extremist doctrines to be 
impossible – combinations like collective ownership and tyranny, progressive 
social policies and full employment under capitalisation, large-scale 
governmental controls with public liberties – are actually possible. The full 
awareness that nationalisation is no universal solution to economic problems 
and that British socialism has not resulted in tyranny have materially 
weakened the ideologies of thorough-going socialism and thorough-going 
neo-liberalism. 
 
(Shils, 1955: 53) 
This important statement by Aron is clearly far removed from the work both 
of Mises and Hayek, who framed the differences between state planning and free 
market capitalism strictly in either/or terms. Aron argues, by way of response, 
that there is more to the ‘Left’ than simply an ambition for centralised control of 
the economy through ‘planning’. In The Opium of the Intellectuals, he develops 
this position further by considering a range of leftist ideologies that are to lesser 
or greater extent ‘authoritarian’, ‘liberal’ or ‘egalitarian’ in basis (see Aron 
1957b: 32), and arguing that between these different positions are often practical 
points of reconciliation and compromise with forms of economic liberalism. For 
this reason, Aron insists that there is no necessary dichotomy between a market 
economy, on one hand, and ‘total planning on the other’, for, in practice, these 
are ‘rival models’ that ‘no existing economy actually reproduces’. Indeed, he 
declares that ‘Mixed systems are not monsters incapable of surviving, or 
transitional forms on the way to the pure type: they are the normal thing’ (Aron, 
1957b: 311). For Aron, the only way forward was to recognise this fact and to 
move beyond the ‘fanaticism’ of both of sides of this debate (pro-Soviet and 
neoliberal) by developing a sociology and politics that were no longer steeped in 
ideology. 
In Milan, Aron was not alone in questioning the dichotomy between state 
planning and market capitalism that had been central to key neoliberal tracts such 
as Hayek’s (1944) Road to Serfdom. Betrand de Jouvenel – a journalist, political 
philosopher and founder member of the Mont Pèlerin Society whom Aron knew 
well (they attended the same lycée and later met through an association of the 
League of Nations in Geneva; see Aron, 1990: 33, 105) – gave a provocative 
speech on the ‘fundamental similarities’ between Soviet and capitalist economic 
systems. The centre-piece of this speech was a section on ‘Stalinist super-
capitalism’, in which de Jouvenel (1956) argued that ‘the economic regime of 
the Soviet Union, being a regime of very rapid accumulation, bears a greater 
likeness to the Marxist model of Capitalism than does the Capitalism of the 
unionised Western democracies’ (p. 64). Unsurprisingly, Jouvenel’s views 
‘enraged’ many of his fellow Mont Pèlerin Society members, in particular Mises, 
Hayek and Röpke (see Audier, 2012b: 317) who refused to see any structural 
similarities between Soviet and Western capitalist societies. But among 
Congress members in Milan, both Jouvenel and Aron and found a more 
sympathetic audience that was intent on asking whether the Soviet economic 
system, ‘by virtue of being a large-scale industrial system’, in fact ‘had to 
confront the same problems as a market economy in making decisions as to the 
types and quantities of goods to be produced, the allocation of resources, etc.?’ 
(Shils, 1955: 54). Aron and Jouvenel agreed that this was the case, and on this 
point they clearly departed from Hayek (1948: 79), for whom there were only 
two choices: central planning or market-based planning through competition. 
The distance between Aron and Hayek on this question is notable, for Aron 
treated the idea of central planning as nothing more than an ideal-typical or 
perhaps even ideological ‘myth’, one that had unnecessarily preoccupied leftist 
advocates of Soviet society as well as their neoliberal critics. 
What was Hayek’s response to this line of attack? Unfortunately, there is no 
record of his contribution to this event as he does not feature in Shils’ and 
MacDonald’s accounts, or in The Soviet Economy – the collection of papers 
produced out of the Milan conference (see Aron et al., 1956). One thing we do 
know is that one of the main disagreements at this event was between Hayek, 
who, on one hand, insisted on the spontaneity of the social order and the rule of 
law, and Hugh Gaitskell, who argued for the democratic participation of 
employees in the life of enterprise. Audier (2012b) describes the general mood 
of the conference as one that was more favourable to the latter position and to 
‘passing from a dogmatic opposition between socialism and capitalism’ to ‘a 
compromise in favour of the mixed economy’ (p. 317; translation mine). This 
clearly placed Hayek in a difficult position. Audier surmises that Aron, in 
situating communism and liberalism in the same category of industrial societies 
called for an end to doctrinaire socialism and liberalism, and in taking this 
position publicly criticised and marginalised Hayek, who had spoken the day 
before. Relations between Aron and Hayek soured from this point onwards, but 
Michael Polanyi, who most likely invited Hayek to this event (see Scott-Smith, 
2002: 451), remained on good terms with him and the pair continued to 
correspond after this event. On 9 November 1955, Polanyi wrote to Hayek to 
apologise for the conduct of the chairman of this event and the ‘clumsiness of 
Sidney Hook’, which had led to part of Hayek’s opening statement to be lost 
(Polanyi, 1955). On 20 November, Hayek (1955) replied to Polanyi that the 
conference had been ‘heavily weighted’ on the ‘Labour side’ and that while he 
had wanted to defend his point of view he became ‘increasingly discouraged and 
finally felt it was of no use’. Despite this, Hayek still hoped to have the 
opportunity to respond to Aron’s accusation that there was an ‘inverted 
Marxism’ that was inherent in his position, one, presumably, that gave 
sovereignty to the market rather than to the state. He added that he had never 
wanted the Mont Pèlerin Society to be ‘homogeneous in the sense that all 
members should agree’ and that if Polanyi, Aron and Jouvenel were to leave the 
Society, he would ‘probably rapidly lose interest in the proceedings and get tired 
of the thing’ (Hayek, 1955). 
In the event, Aron did resign his membership of the Mont Pèlerin Society that 
year, presumably because of the disagreements with Hayek and others that had 
surfaced at Milan. However, he remained active in the Congress for Cultural 
Freedom in the immediate years that followed, and in 1960 organised an event 
at Basel–Rheinfelden, the materials from which were published in abridged form 
in 1963 under the title World Technology and Human Destiny. In his opening 
‘report’ at this event, entitled, ‘Industrial Society and the Political Dialogues of 
the West’, Aron (1963) framed the task in hand in the following way: 
Private property versus public ownership, anarchy of the market versus 
planned economy, capitalist exploitation versus equality ... have lost a great 
deal of their force. Whether the issue is the status of property, planning, or the 
equalization of income, henceforth it is not so much a question of choosing 
between two alternatives than of combining two complementary, methods, of 
deciding how far one should go in a given direction. 
 
(p. 6) 
This statement, which is in keeping with the views expressed by Aron in his 
writings from the mid- to late-1950s, is underpinned by a theory of industrial 
society developed from the work of Saint-Simon and Comte (see Aron, 1967: 
15–17). For Hayek and von Mises, Saint-Simon and Comte were sociologists of 
the worst type as their methodological and political commitments to collectivism 
were authoritarian and perhaps even totalitarian in basis (see Hayek, 1952; Von 
Mises, 2007; Gane, 2014). But for Aron (1967), the importance of these thinkers 
lies in their theory of industrial society, which in distinction to that of Marx 
‘attached little value to differences in political systems because it refused to give 
importance to the form of ownership’ (p. 17). This meant that it was possible to 
analyse different variants of industrial society (be it capitalist or communist in 
political form) by focussing on their underlying modes of social organisation 
and, in particular, institutions such as the family, the state and culture (see Aron, 
1967: 15). This meant, to the disdain of figures such as Hayek and Mises who 
both defended private property as a first principle, comparable structural features 
of capitalist and communist societies (e.g. the presence of class inequalities in 
both) could potentially be identified and analysed without first of all subsuming 
them to the values of a particular type of political regime. 
For Aron, the work of Comte is particularly important in this regard as it is 
said to transcend a crude opposition between capitalism and socialism, and 
with this any ideological commitment either to class struggle or the 
nationalisation of industrial production (see Aron, 1963: 7). What Comte offers 
instead is a definition of industrial society that is not defined by industry itself 
but rather by a number of other ‘essential features’, namely, ‘freedom of work 
for the individual’, the determination of hierarchy and values by the ‘functional 
organization of work and society’ and the transformation of work by the 
‘systematic application of science to the organization of production’ (Aron, 
1963: 59). But this is as far as Aron follows Comte, for he argues that there is 
a degree of economic determinism in his positivism that mirrors that of Marx. 
He writes, ‘Both Comte and Marx used to say that, given a certain type of 
economy, a certain type of society, politics, and way of thought will follow’. 
Aron (1963) responds by taking a different position: ‘I say exactly the contrary: 
given a certain type of economic organization, the possibility remains open for 
various political regimes, various beliefs, various religions, and in the most 
profound sense of the term, various human communities’ (p. 72). Aron’s point 
is, again, that the social should not be reduced to the play of economic or 
political forces and that if some degree of separation between these two is 
maintained, then it becomes possible to analyse the structural dynamics of 
different types of industrial society without situating them within a false 
dichotomy between ‘planned’ socialism and free market capitalism. For it is 
precisely the intersection of concerns between the institutional dynamics of the 
social and the spheres of politics and economics that forms the ‘proper subject 
of the sociologist’ (Aron, 1961a: 21) – a disciplinary affiliation that Aron 
applies to himself (see Aron, 1961a: 23). 
Hayek’s Constitution of Liberty 
Through the course of the 1960 conference at Basel–Rheinfelden, Aron (1963) 
publicly distanced himself from Hayek, and in particular from his opinion that 
‘any interference by the state is the beginning of enslavement’, by stating bluntly 
in reply that ‘We have no example of totalitarianism evolving out of dirigisme 
in a democratic country’ (p. 81). The differences between Aron and Hayek, 
however, did not stop there. In his opening report at this conference, Aron (1963) 
spoke of a ‘doctrinal conflict’ over the concept and question of liberty (p. 9). 
While Aron does not cite Hayek by name, this is a thinly veiled reference to 
Hayek’s (1960) Constitution of Liberty, which was published in 1960 – the same 
year as the Basel–Rheinfelden conference. In 1962, Aron (1994) wrote a detailed 
review of this classic neoliberal text that returns to the core question of the Walter 
Lippmann Colloquium: ‘what a free society, that is, a good society, ought to be’ 
(p. 73). It is instructive to consider the main arguments of this review as they 
reveal many key points of difference between Aron and Hayek that otherwise lie 
concealed. 
Aron’s first step in this review is to take issue with the concept of liberty that 
lies at the heart of Hayek’s position. He observes that Hayek defines liberty in 
negative terms as the absence of constraint, but argues that this idea of constraint 
lacks clarity for it treats coercion in ‘more and less’ terms: if people ‘escape from 
constraint, they are free; or better, reduction of constraint gives the measure of 
their liberty’ (Aron, 1994: 74). Aron problematises this definition by citing the 
example of a soldier who is constrained in their daily actions but nonetheless 
consents as they have not necessarily enrolled in the army under conditions of 
force. In light of this example, he argues that Hayek, in defining liberty in terms 
of individual decisions, neglects the underlying structural, political and 
democratic contexts within which such decisions are made. This leads Aron 
(1994) to make an important sociological point: 
Life in society implies the coordination of individual activities. In turn, this 
coordination requires rules, that is, the distinction between what is authorised 
and what is forbidden. It also requires a hierarchy of authority in no-matter-
what collective enterprise, economic or military. 
 
(p. 75) 
Hayek, for Aron, fails to see the fundamentally social basis of liberty, and in so 
doing neglects the necessary relationship between freedom and authority in all 
industrial societies, again regardless of their political organisation. Hayek, 
instead, insists on the rule of law, which is supposed to apply equally both to 
those who govern and those who are governed. Such law is to be general and 
therefore should not constrain any particular individual interests. But Aron takes 
issue with this position, observing that a law that is general in theory may 
nonetheless be felt to be ‘oppressive’ and potentially discriminatory by those to 
which, in practice, it applies. In answer to Hayek’s proposition that ‘a law ought 
to be as acceptable to those it strikes as to those it does not concern’, Aron (1994) 
cites the example of progressive taxation as a general law that is unable to escape 
the charge either of bias or coercion by the parties involved: the rich ‘will 
complain of discrimination’ or the poor ‘will take umbrage at privileges’ (p. 80). 
The conclusion Aron (1994) draws from this case is that Hayek’s ideal of general 
law cannot hold, for ‘there is no objective criterion of non-discrimination and 
non-privilege (no more than there is an objective, external definition of 
constraint)’ (p. 81). 
From this broadly philosophical starting point, Aron moves to a consideration 
of the ‘socio-economic’ aspects of Hayek’s text. He initially agrees with the 
basic tenet of Hayek’s liberalism, namely that ‘the goal of a free society ought 
to be to limit as much as possible the government of men by men and to increase 
the government of men by laws’ (Aron, 1994: 82). But Aron adds another level 
of complexity by arguing, against any theory of pure bureaucracy, that it is ‘men’ 
rather than laws per se that guarantee the exercise of justice. Drawing on Locke, 
he observes that this is the case, in particular, for the foreign affairs of nation-
states – in the drawing up of international treaties and in matters of war and peace 
to which few laws apply (this perhaps explains Aron’s early interest in 
Lippmann, who had been part of the team that drafted Woodrow Wilson’s 
‘Fourteen Points’ at the close of the First World War; see Steel, 1999: 128–140). 
Aron’s (1994) position, in response to Hayek, is that federative power never 
proceeds purely on the basis of general law, and in turn he broadens this into a 
more general point: 
All power includes some element of the government of men by men; liberty 
is not adequately defined by sole reference to the rule of law: the manner in 
which those who hold this power are chosen, as well as the way in which they 
exercise it, are felt, in our day as integral parts of liberty. 
 
(p. 85; emphasis mine) 
Aron (1994), then, is concerned not only with structural conditions of 
democracy but also with questions of ‘feeling’ or what he calls ‘the problem of 
interior liberty’ (p. 85). One of the problems of Hayek’s approach, and also that 
of fellow Walter Colloquium and Mont Pèlerin Society member Jacques Rueff, 
he argues, is that their distinction between liberty and coercion is based upon a 
primarily economic model of subjectivity, within which the individual is either 
free to choose goals and means or becomes simply an instrument of ‘planners’. 
Rueff polarises these two ideal-types of economic action into two forms of 
political governance – liberal versus authoritarian or individualistic versus 
communist – but Aron (1994) observes that Hayek’s approach is more subtle as 
it moves towards the former of these two binaries through ‘the intermediary of 
the generality of the laws’: laws which forbid certain types of individual conduct 
but at the same time ‘leave a margin of choice’ and ‘do not encroach upon the 
sphere of individual decision’ (p. 88). Aron, however, nonetheless objects to this 
idea of freedom as he argues that even the most impersonal of rules can produce 
the ‘sentiment’ of oppression. And he adds a further point of criticism: while 
Hayek’s Constitution of Liberty seeks to protect and enlarge the sphere of private 
freedom by reducing state intervention and appealing to the rule of law (two 
things that are not necessarily compatible), liberty is never simply a private 
concern. Indeed, Aron (1994) writes that 
Men sacrifice a part of their private sphere in order to be governed by brothers 
of their race, language or religion, in order to be treated as equals, in order to 
have a fatherland, even in hope of escaping misery and poverty. 
 
(p. 89) 
In light of this, liberty need not be economic in the first instance, as it can be 
social or political in basis and thus collective rather than private or individualistic 
in form, a position that again is far removed from the neoliberal philosophy of 
market-freedoms advanced by Hayek. 
Aron extends many of these arguments in the Jefferson Lectures he delivered 
at Berkeley in 1963, which were published subsequently in English in 1970 
under the title An Essay on Freedom. Aron (1970) opens these lectures by 
reconsidering the work of Alexis de Tocqueville, the value of which is said to lie 
in its treatment of democracy as a condition of society rather than as a form of 
government (pp. 9–10) and, more fundamentally, in its refusal to follow leftist 
approaches, from Saint-Simon through to Marx, that are said to share a tendency 
to subordinate politics to economics (Aron, 1970: 19). Aron (1970) initially 
returns to these ideas from de Tocqueville in order to counter what he calls the 
‘nightmare’ of Marxism (p. 50), but through the course of these lectures he 
extends them, in the opposite direction, into a critique of the core arguments of 
Hayek’s Constitution of Liberty. Aron presents Hayek as a ‘non-conformist’ who 
pushes a ‘liberal-individualist’ or ‘Whig’ critique of socialism to an extreme by 
prioritising the freedom of the individual from political forms of coercion. Aron 
is partly sympathetic towards Hayek’s project but, at the same time, argues that 
freedom is not simply individual in basis as there are many positive freedoms 
made possible, under certain conditions, by collective entities such as the nation 
and the state. Aron (1970) explains, 
The formation of an independent nation eventually becomes for a population, 
even one that is theoretically an integral part of the liberal state, the necessary 
condition for the personal freedoms in a twofold sense. The individual will 
not feel free even if, according to the legislation in force, he ought to 
experience the feeling of freedom, as long as discrimination between the 
ethnic group to which he belongs and the dominant group persists in practice. 
Nor will he be able to arrive at the positive freedom of political participation 
as long as he does not recognise as his own the state of which he is 
theoretically a citizen. If freedom as participation is, in our time, an integral 
part of freedom as we conceive of it, national liberation is an indispensable 
element or phase of this freedom. 
 
(pp. 60–61) 
Aron argues that Hayek’s neoliberalism pushes the argument for individual 
freedom too far and abandons any concern for political freedoms that transcend 
the economic freedoms of ideal-typical figures such as the ‘consumer’ or the 
‘entrepreneur’. In response, Aron emphasises important connections between 
personal freedom and nationhood and also the key role the state has in tackling 
questions of inequalities of different kinds. Here, he speaks strongly in support 
of the social state while at the same time drawing the line at government policies 
that seek to achieve a far-reaching distribution of income. He writes that ‘The 
state can and should assure to all, through social legislation, the minimum of 
resources needed to have a decent life at the level tolerated by the collective 
wealth’ (Aron, 1970: 93) and adds that if socialism does have a place then it lies 
in supporting this cause. 
There are three further problems with Hayek’s position that Aron addresses 
in turn through the course of these lectures. First, he argues that, factually, it is 
not correct to insist on the fundamental incompatibility between planned and 
market-based economies for in practice ‘capitalist economies have absorbed a 
sufficient dose of intervention and government ownership so that socialism is 
seen as part of reality rather than a transcendent project which could be carried 
out only by means of a violent revolution ...’ (Aron, 1970: 53). In response to 
Hayek, Aron (1970) takes a strong position on this point: not only are capitalist 
economies what he calls ‘mixed regimes’ but also there is no direct line from a 
partially planned economy, which he sees as the normal state of things, through 
to a totally planned economy and an accompanying totalitarian state. This, he 
writes, is an ‘obviously false idea’ (p. 83). Second, in line with his review of The 
Constitution of Liberty, he argues that Hayek’s negative definition of freedom 
from coercion is far too restrictive as its resulting emphasis on individual 
economic freedoms does nothing to capture the freedoms of most members of 
contemporary capitalist society: from the worker on a production line to 
employees of a ‘vast organization’ through to the Jesuit ‘who has taken a vow of 
obedience’ (Aron, 1970: 89). Again, what is missing, for Aron, is a consideration 
of collective social and political forms that offer the promise of positive 
freedoms of different types. And third, Aron argues that Hayek’s answer to this 
problem is to assert the rule of law as the basic means for ensuring freedom in 
practice. Aron is torn on this point, for, on one hand, he agrees that the rule of 
law is central to the operation of Western liberalism, but, on the other, treats it 
as an ideal rather than as a fact, and argues that it is a mistake to see it as 
something that is ‘fully accessible to all’ or ‘coextensive with the whole 
existence of society’. In a key passage, Aron (1970) states, 
Whether we like it or not, the governments of societies will always be 
characterised by the power of some men over others; in time of crisis, when 
threatened by other collectivities, rulers make decisions which involve all the 
citizens and inevitably make these citizens their instruments. 
 
(p. 90) 
He adds that the same can be said of the modern business world, which, for the 
most part, is not about the creative freedoms of entrepreneurs but the emergence 
of large organisations in which the freedoms of the majority of workers are quite 
limited. For these reasons, Aron (1970) argues that Hayek’s emphasis on the rule 
of law, and its accompanying commitment to the protection of private freedoms 
‘confuses one aspect of freedom with the whole of freedom’ (p. 91) and is, on its 
own, not nearly enough. 
Conclusion 
The divisions between Aron and Hayek can be best described in terms of a split 
between, on one hand, a social and political conservatism that sought to protect 
the practical workings of liberal democracy and to some extent the welfare state 
and, on the other, a thoroughgoing neoliberalism that was founded on a 
fundamental belief in the liberatory powers of the market. In 1960, this division 
between conservatism and neoliberalism was cemented by Hayek (1960), who 
in his postscript to The Constitution of Liberty (entitled ‘Why I am not a 
Conservative’; pp. 343–356) argued that the problem of conservatism was that it 
was a reactionary rather than an agenda-setting movement, and for this reason, 
unlike neoliberalism, it was destined to operate on grounds that were not of its 
own making. The sociological ideas that had been present at the outset of Mont 
Pèlerin Society – many of which had questioned the logic and rationale of 
Hayek’s economic liberalism – had by this time largely disappeared, and with 
the estrangement of figures such as Aron the Society began to address a far 
narrower set of economic concerns (particularly under the guidance of Milton 
Friedman; see Burgin, 2012: 123–151). It was at this point that the neoliberal 
‘thought collective’, as described by Mirowski and Plehwe (2009), began to take 
shape – a history that has now been well documented. The fate of the sociology 
that was cast out of the neoliberal project through the 1950s is, however, less 
clear, and this leaves the question of what might be gained by revisiting this 
sociology, and in particular Aron’s critique of Hayek’s neoliberalism, today. 
This is not an easy question to answer in part because Aron refused to align 
himself with any particular school of social or political theory, with the 
consequence that, unlike Hayek, he had few followers. This appears to have been 
an intentional strategy of Aron’s (1997) intellectual practice: ‘in adopting certain 
positions, I have been a man very much alone in the face of history and in the 
face of intellectual styles’ (pp. 253–254). Following Aron’s death in 1983, one 
of his former students, Stanley Hoffman (1983), expanded on this point, 
observing that 
Throughout his life, Aron had shocked the French by taking unfashionable 
stands, by flouting the conventional distinction between and left and right, not 
because he liked to be provocative ... but because of his passion against myths 
and prejudices, his need for intellectual lucidity, and his attachment to liberal 
values. 
Aron did indeed distance himself from the major political ideologies of both the 
Left and the Right through the post-War period, but it is important to note that 
his critique of ideological and utopian thinking was directed primarily at the 
Marxist intelligentsia rather than towards the ideologies of the new Right. This 
led Shils (1985) to describe Aron as ‘the most severe, and the most learned critic 
of Marxism and of the socialist – or more precisely Communist – order of society 
...’ (p. 3). It was this critical and, at the time, largely unfashionable relation to 
Marxism that initially placed Aron in the same circles as Hayek and other 
members of the Mont Pèlerin Society. Indeed, Aron’s (1996) Opium of the 
Intellectuals was an attack on the ‘myths’ of the Left and a commentary on the 
likely collapse of Marxism as the ‘last great ideology’; nowhere, even in late 
works such as In Defence of Decadent Europe (pp. 3–75), did he subject 
neoliberalism, with its new utopia of the market, to such sustained critique. 
But this did not mean that Aron was comfortable in the company of Hayek as 
they were clearly divided over how liberalism should respond to Soviet-style 
communism: Aron opposing all forms of political tyranny by re-asserting core 
liberal-democratic principles; Hayek offering an economic solution that largely 
dismissed the value of democracy itself (see Fischer, 2009: 326–369). Aron, for 
his part, was not opposed to the play of free market forces (see 1997: 201), but 
argued that societies, or liberty for that matter, should not simply be understood 
or judged according to abstract economic principles such as ‘competition’ (see 
1961b: 93) or ‘a rate of growth’ (see 1997: 266). For this reason, he declared that 
the authority to address issues ultimately should not lie in the field of economics: 
‘I am suspicious of the ruses of reason as much as I am the virtuosity of 
economists’ (1994: 90). Some have characterised Aron, as a consequence, as a 
political thinker (see, for example, Anderson, 1997), but such a characterisation 
misses the fact that Aron’s differences with Hayek and with neoliberalism more 
generally were not simply political; they were also sociological. For whereas 
Hayek had little time for the social – that ‘weasel word’ (see Hayek, 1991) – and 
forcefully disassociated his own position from classical sociologists such as 
Auguste Comte (see Gane, 2014), Aron came back time and again to the social 
basis of liberalism, and drew extensively on the work of Comte and Saint-Simon 
to develop a framework for analysing the societal basis of different forms of 
industrialism. Aron did this because he was concerned not simply with the 
economic motivations of individual actors or with the dynamics and logic of the 
market, but with the operation of a range of different social institutions, many of 
which, he argued, can take a socialistic form even within capitalist society (see 
1957b: 309). At the heart of Aron’s critique of neoliberalism, then, lies a defence 
both of the social as a realm that cannot simply be reduced to politics or 
economics and of sociology as the discipline that can produce comparative 
understandings of the societal dynamics of different forms of political and 
economic organisation. Aron’s conservative political commitments aside, this 
defence of the social and of sociology divided him from Hayek and continues to 
be a valuable undertaking in a world in which economic categories and 
explanations increasingly hold sway. 
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